I. INTRODUCTION Kearns (1996, 9) describes nonprofit accountability, in part, as that "wide spectrum of public expectations dealing with organizational performance, responsiveness . . . of nonprofit organizations." Nonprofit accountability has been thrust on to the public agenda by a series of financial scandals, revelations of excessive compensation, and concerns over unethical behavior.
Lapses in accountability have affected nonprofit organizations as varied as the United Way of
America (Murawski 1995) , Adelphi University (Thornburg 1997) , and the NAACP (Greene 1995) . In response to increasing public concern, Congress has instituted measures designed to increase accountability and oversight in this sector.
1 However, little attention has focused on the impact of these measures. The particular measure examined in this paper is the effectiveness of a long-standing form of oversight, the Single Audit Act (SAA). Single audits were mandated by Congress to improve financial management by federal grant recipients and to provide a uniform set of auditing requirements for federal grants.
Effective January 1, 1990, most nonprofit organizations receiving government funding became subject to the SAA and its associated regulations as promulgated in OMB Circular A-133: Audits of States, Local Governments, and Nonprofit Organizations. The A-133 circular outlines audit procedures and guidelines for allowable costs that can be charged to federal grants.
Since 1996, any nonprofit entity expending at least $300,000 in any one year must undergo an annual A-133 audit. Each A-133 audit consists of two sets of procedures: general requirements including a traditional audit conducted by a licensed certified public accountant (CPA) and an assessment of the internal control structure plus specific procedures that analyze the use of -3 -federal funds and compliance of programs with certain laws and regulations. Since an A-133 audit demands audit skills beyond those necessary for a standard CPA audit, auditors are required to obtain specialized training and expertise. Overall, A-133 audits are a highly rigorous form of nonprofit oversight, which is expensive and challenging for both the auditor and the auditee.
The amount of federal assistance to state and local governments and nonprofit entities exceeds $100 billion each year (Brown and Raghunandan 1995) . Hence, single audits of governmental and nonprofit entities may be an important oversight tool, particularly in ascertaining whether the funding was used in accordance with laws and regulations. Some empirical research has examined the impact of the costs and quality of A-133 audits of state and local governments (for example, Raman and Wilson 1992) . The President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency found that 34 percent of A-133 audits of governmental entities report some negative audit findings (Broadus and Comtois 1987) . No comparable studies have been done of single audits of nonprofit organizations.
This exploratory study examines both the nonprofit organizations undergoing A-133 audits and the audit firms conducting these audits. Since no previous empirical study has examined audits of nonprofit organizations conducted under the Single Audit Act, the purpose of this exploratory study is largely descriptive. We examine the following research questions:
1. What are the attributes of nonprofit organizations receiving government grants and contracts?
2. Which audit firms conduct A-133 audits?
3. What is the frequency of audit findings? Do they vary by grant size, grant type, or auditor?
Using a database of A-133 audit information obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau and Form 990 tax data obtained from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), we identified the attributes of nonprofit organizations receiving federal grants, the attributes of auditors conducting A-133 audits, and the frequency of adverse findings. Overall, we found that nonprofit organizations' programs appear to be in compliance with federal laws and regulations governing federal awards. Reportable conditions were disclosed by the auditor in just over 15 percent of the reports, while material noncompliance was reported in 3 percent of the audit reports.
2 While the Big 5 audit firms conducted a high number of audits (about 300 A-133 audits per firm), they only provided 12 percent of the total market. The majority of nonprofit A-133 audits were conducted by small or specialist firms that performed fewer than ten nonprofit A-133 audits per year during the period examined. Nonprofit industry sub-sector, auditor type, and financial variables affected the rate at which adverse audit findings were reported.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Information about the requirements of the Single Audit Act is provided in Section II, followed by a review of empirical research on A-133 audits in Section III. The sample and methodology are presented in Section IV. Results and discussion of findings conclude the paper in Sections V and VI, respectively.
II. THE SINGLE AUDIT ACT
A. History of the Single Audit Act
Auditing in the private sector is governed by rules promulgated by the public accounting profession and referred to as generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). The Comptroller
General of the United States issues Governmental Auditing Standards that are broader in scope than GAAS and require additional reports, for example, a statement on program compliance with -5 -laws and regulations, and the identification of material internal control weaknesses. These standards are often referred to as generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS).
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General Accounting Office (GAO) concern over the laxity of internal controls of nonprofit organizations receiving federal funds surfaced in the 1970s (GAO 1986a (GAO , 1986b (GAO , 1989 . These concerns led to the issuance of uniform audit requirements, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circulars A-110 for certain nonprofit organizations and A-102 for state and local governments. Unfortunately, the guidance was not effectively implemented by federal agencies (Gross et al. 2000) . During this period, federal agencies responsible for various financial assistance programs generally required the recipient organizations to have audits conducted on each separate grant or contract. These special purpose audits were intended to assure the funding agency that the recipient had complied with all legal requirements and that the resources had been used only for purposes allowed under the grant. Accordingly, these audits were limited in scope and did not necessarily examine the overall internal control system of the recipient organizations. Often, organizations with awards from several federal agencies had to deal with multiple audit firms conducting audits of overlapping scope and time periods.
The motivation behind the Single Audit Act (SAA) of 1984 included improving audit efficiency and reducing audit costs through uniform audit requirements and the elimination of duplicate audit processes. It was also expected to improve the financial management and accountability of recipient organizations and ensure that federal departments and agencies used the information provided by the audits. The SSA requires audited financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). In addition, the auditor must perform three types of special audit procedures related to federal financial assistance programs. First, the auditor renders an opinion on whether the supplementary schedule of expenditures associated with federal awards is fairly stated in all material respects. Second, the auditor reports on program compliance with laws and regulations that may have a material effect on each major federal assistance program. Third, the auditor must determine whether the entity has established internal accounting and administrative controls to provide reasonable assurance that federal monies are managed in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. In other words, the auditor's role is to examine the entire accounting process not just the reported numbers. with no reported material weaknesses in internal controls or legal compliance problems. In our sample, 58 percent of the audits were of no nprofit entities classified as low-risk auditees.
Once the auditor has determined the status of the programs and the auditee, the auditor must audit as a "major program" all high-risk Type A programs, at least half of low-risk Type A programs, and at least half of high-risk Type B programs. For many nonprofits, the auditor must expand the audit scope to ensure that the audited programs encompass at least 50 percent of all federal award money expended by the recipient. In addition, each Type A program must be audited at least once every three years as a major program, regardless of risk classification.
The auditor must produce numerous reports. First, the auditor reports whether the financial statements were in conformity with GAAP and the schedule of Federal award expenditures were fairly presented in all material respects (financial statement opinion). The opinion can be unqualified, qualified, adverse or a disclaimer of opinion. The audit opinion may also contain language that questions the nonprofit's ability to operate as a going concern.
Second, the auditor must provide an opinion on whether the major programs are in material compliance with laws, regulations, and the provisions of contract or grant agreements (material compliance opinion). Since the auditee may have multiple programs, the opinion can be mixed, where some programs receive an unqualified opinion, and others receive qualified or adverse opinions or disclaimers of opinion. Third, a schedule of any reportable conditions in internal controls must be filed. If a finding is reported, the auditor must indicate whether or not it is a material weakness. Finally, the auditor must indicate if there is any material noncompliance with laws, regulations or cost allocations.
III. PRIOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE SINGLE AUDIT ACT
Academic research on single audits has examined four primary issues: the impact on compliance, audit fees, the quality of the audits conducted, and the frequency of adverse findings. While the studies we have identified focused on single audits of governmental entities, the findings may be generalizable to nonprofit organizations. Engstrom (1992) reported that CPAs but not their municipal clients believe that audits were more effective and efficient under the SAA and that single aud its have improved over time. However, neither group believes that the SAA had resulted in more effective or efficient use of federal funds. In contrast, Brannan The audit fee research hypothesizes that the Single Audit Act has increased auditing fees due to additional audit procedures, more potential liability, and requirements that auditors receive supplemental audit training. However, this increase in costs might be offset by reducing the number of audits conducted and through enhanced audit efficiency. One notable study (Raman and Wilson 1992) provides evidence indicating no significant gains in audit efficiency and that independent accounting firms absorbed the incremental costs associated with the SAA rather than passing them along to their municipal clients.
The literature examining the quality of audits of governmental entities is extensive (Marks and Raman 1986; Hardiman, Squires and Smith 1987; Palmrose 1988; Roberts, Glezen and Jones 1990; Raman and Wallace 1994; Deis and Giroux 1992; Lawrence 1999) . Studies of single audits began with General Accounting Office (GAO) reports criticizing the quality of audits of governmental entities conducted by certified public accounting firms in the 1980s (GAO 1986a (GAO , 1986b (GAO , 1989 . The 1986 report indicated that as many as one-third of all audits of recipients of federal financial assistance failed to conform to professional standards. Using the GAO data, Copley and Doucet (1993) found a positive relationship between fixed fee arrangements and single audits deemed substandard, suggesting that audit quality suffers when the auditor has an incentive to limit the amount of audit testing to assure the engagement remains profitable. Raghunandan (1995 and 1997) found little improvement in the quality of governmental audits since the original 1986 GAO report despite Yellow Book standards that require government-specific continuing education for auditors conducting single audits and increased use of quality reviews.
Finally, some researchers have focused on two of our areas of interest. First, Krishman and Schauer (2000) examine the audit quality in the nonprofit sector by examining the quality of United Way operating agency audits (A-133 audits were not separately analyzed). Second, Jakubowski (1995) looked at which auditors conducted A-133 audits and the frequency of audit findings for governmental entities. He found that state auditors conducting A-133 audits report more internal control weaknesses than do private audit firms. In addition when the frequency of reported internal control weaknesses during the first four years of single audits was examined, he found significant differences between cities and counties. In the first year of the SAA, an average of 2.8 material internal control weaknesses were found in counties and 1.8 in cities. By the third and fourth years of the SAA, the number of reported material internal control weaknesses had fallen by 42 percent for cities, but only by 13 percent for counties. As a result, Jakubowski concluded that county governments made few changes in their control structures while municipal governments made significant improveme nts. This confirms earlier findings by Coe and Ellis (1991) that improper acts were more common in county government than in municipalities.
IV. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY
While Jakubowski studied governmental entities, our investigation focuses on nonprofit organizations. Our data set is derived from A-133 audit information available from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse and Form 990 IRS tax data available from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). The A-133 database provides data collected from auditors conducting the single audits and includes the auditee, auditor, cognizant or oversight federal agency, total awards amount, and audit findings. After our efforts to eliminate incomplete and duplicate data and standardize spelling of audit firm names, the resulting data set includes 83,708 single audits of both nonprofit and governmental organizations conducted from 1997 through 2000. We combined the single audit act data with the IRS Business Master File using the employer identification number (EIN). From this we identified that 37,540 audits were completed by nonprofit organizations, representing 17,363 organizations. We then matched the dataset to the NCCS 1999 "core file" using name and audit year. Although human service agencies represented the majority of single audits, their average total assets ($4.1 million) and total revenues ($3.7 million) were substantially smaller than the other sectors. In contrast, the health and education sectors had the most assets ($33.3 and $139.0 million, respectively) and revenues ($31.9 and $54.0 million, respectively). Educational organizations, on average, expended the most federal awards annually ($16.9 million), probably due to the inclusion of financial aid and educationa l loans to students. Arts organizations, at the other extreme, expended the least federal award amounts ($1.6 million). Note that medians for the dollar figures in Table 1 were often dramatically different than the averages indicating wide variability in organizational size and award amounts -particularly for the education sector.
To assess the relative financial health of these organizations, we computed two ratios, financial leverage (debt/assets) and the surplus margin (net income/total revenue). While the sectors differ based on average assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses, these differences were accentuated when examining the ratios. The average financial leverage for the entire sample was 56.5 percent, yet only 34.9 and 35.2 percent of art and educational organizations' assets, respectively, were financed through debt, while human services agencies relied on debt to finance 66.7 percent of their assets. Arts organizations reported the highest mean surplus margin (16.2 percent). Human service agencies have the lowest mean and median surplus margin (0.4 percent for both measures).
B. Audit Firms Conducting Single Audits of Nonprofit Organizations
In 3. Specialist: those firms that are neither "Big-5" nor "Regional" but conducted 30 or more A-133 audits of both governmental and nonprofit entities over the sample period.
4. Other: those smaller audit firms not included in the previous groups and a few government auditors.
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As Table 2 indicates, the Big-5 firms tend to audit the largest organizations, which is not surprising since these firms typically audit the largest business enterprises in the for-profit sector.
Mean and median total assets, total revenues, total expenses, and federal awards expended were significantly higher for organizations audited by these firms. Although each Big-5 firm performed an average of 303 nonprofit A-133 audits, this represented only 12% of the total number of A-133 audits conducted. In contrast, the 15 regional firms conducted an average of 50 nonprofit A-133 audits (6% of all audits), while 411 specialist firms conducted an average of 10 nonprofit A-133 audits (30% of all audits) during the study period. The remaining firms performed the majority of the NPO single audits, but averaged only 2.0 NPO audits during the study period. The mean and median total assets, total revenues, total expenses and federal awards expended were the lowest for these small, non-specialist audit firms. This group audited a disproportionately high number of human services organizations and a disproportionately low number of educational organizations. The Big-5 firms conducted 34 percent of the A-133 audits of educational institutions as well as a disproportionately high percentage of the arts organizations (22 percent).
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C. Analysis of the Frequency of Audit Findings
The frequency of audit findings was examined both by nonprofit sub-sector and audit type. We consider three types of adverse findings:
1. Financial Statement Opinion: Audit opinion regarding the conformity of the financial statements with GAAP and the fair representation of the schedule of federal award expenditures. In addition, the auditor must disclose if a going concern question exists.
2. Reportable conditions: An auditor must disclose if a reportable condition is found in the internal control system. If found, any of the conditions found to be material weaknesses in internal control must also be disclosed.
3. Material compliance: An auditor must also indicate if the client is in material compliance with contract or grant requirements. For each major program, the auditor must also provide an opinion on whether the particular program is in compliance with laws, regulations, and cost allocations.
Overall, 95.8 percent of the financial statement opinions were unqualified (Table 3) . Of the 529 financial statement opinions that were not unqualified, the majority (95.7 percent) was qualified, indicating some limitation of the audit, such as the inability to gather certain information or the use of a nonstandard accounting practice that affected some aspect of the financial statements. 10 Public/societal benefit organizations were more likely to receive a qualified opinion (6.0 percent as compared to 4.0 percent overall), while arts organizations were the least likely to receive a qualified opinion (1.9 percent). Just over one percent (136) of the financial statement opinions questioned the organization's ability to continue in existence (going concern). Arts organizations had the lowest (0.5 percent), while health care had the highest rate of going concern disclosures (1.6 percent). Interestingly, more than 75% of these "going concern" nonprofits received an unqualified financial statement audit opinion.
A reportable condition was disclosed in 15.7 percent of the single audits and 29.1 percent of these conditions were considered a material weakness in internal control. Health care organizations had the highest rate of reportable conditions and human service organizations had the lowest. Reportable conditions considered a material weakness were reported at the highest rate for public or societal benefit organizations, with 6.9 percent of all audit reports and more than 40 percent of the sector's audit reports indicating a reportable condition that is also a material weaknesses. Arts organizations reported the fewest, with only 2.4 percent of all audit reports and 16.7 percent of the sector reporting a material weakness.
When looking at contract and legal compliance, auditors disclosed that only 3.0 percent of nonprofits were not in material compliance, and this finding was not affected by industry sector. Most organizations (95.0 percent) received unqualified opinions on all their major programs and disclaimers of opinion comprised the bulk of the remaining reports. Other and educational organizations received disclaimers of opinion at the highest rates (6.8 and 6.5 percent respectively, as compared to 4.9 percent overall) and arts instit utions had the lowest disclaimer rate (3.3 percent). Table 4 shows the rate at which nonprofit organizations met the A-133 criteria for classification as low risk auditees and the effect of this classification on the rate at which adverse audit findings were reported. The classification varied significantly by industry sub-sector.
Other and public/societal benefit organizations were more likely to be classified as high-risk auditees (48.3 and 45.9 percent, respectively, as compared to 42.0 percent overall). Educational and arts institutions had the lowest percentage of high-risk auditees (36.3 and 38.9 percent, respectively). High-risk auditees were more than twice as likely to have qualified audit opinions (6.2 percent versus 2.4 percent for low-risk audit ees). The high-risk auditees received going concern language almost three times as often as low-risk auditees (1.7 percent to 0.6 percent for low-risk auditees). High-risk auditees were more likely to have reportable conditions (24.8 percent to 9.1 percent for low-risk auditees). Note that reportable conditions were more often material for the high-risk entities (38.3 percent) than for low-risk auditees (11.2 percent).
Material noncompliance was also significantly more likely for auditees that are not low risk. Table 5 shows the effect of auditor type on the disclosure of adverse audit findings. Big-5 firms were the most likely to have clients classified as low-risk auditees (63.5 percent), and they were also the most likely to render a clean opinion on the financial statements (98.1 percent versus 95.8 percent overall). Their clients were also among the least likely to have going concern language (0.7 percent to 1.1 percent overall), reportable conditions (4.4 percent to 15.7 percent overall), and reportable conditions considered material weaknesses (22.4 percent to 29.3 percent overall). In contrast, the large regional firms disclosed reportable conditions in internal controls at a disproportionately higher rate (21.6 percent) and were the most likely type of firm to include going concern language in their financial statement opinions (1.33 percent). Specialist auditors audited a disproportionately higher percentage of high-risk clients and were substantially more likely to conduct a program-specific audit (5.3 percent of all specialist audits as compared to 3.2 percent overall). The small non-specialist audit firms were more likely to issue financial statements that were qualified (4.8 percent to 4.0 percent overall) and reportable conditions that were material weaknesses (30.0 percent to 29.3 percent overall).
Finally, we examined the relation between audit findings and federal grant size and nonprofit organization size as measured by total revenues. proportionally more reportable conditions, and the reportable conditions were more likely to be considered material. In addition, the auditors more often reported material noncompliance with legal and program requirements.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Audits are the primary tool used by resource providers (donors, grantors, and others) to assure that resources are spent by nonprofit organizations in accordance with the resource provider's intentions. This paper reports on audits that are required by the Federal Government to be completed by organizations receiving large amounts of federal financial assistance. In accordance with the Single Audit Act, these nonprofit organizations must undergo an A-133 audit, a rigorous and expensive form of federal oversight. During the period we examined (1997 to 1999), 3,592 audit firms conducted A-133 audits for 11,841 nonprofit entities. Overall, compliance with federal regulations appears to be high. Although, the audit reports indicated relatively few reportable conditions and even fewer instances of material noncompliance, we did observe some variations in audit findings depending on both the type of audit firm and the specific industry sub-sector of their clients.
We found the arts and education sectors to be similar in several respects, with the most assets, the highest profit margins, and the least reliance on debt. Possibly because of these attributes, the fewest high-risk audits were identified in these two sectors. Interestingly, in spite of appearing to be in excellent financial health, the education sector tended to have far more adverse audit findings than the arts sector.
The human service and public and societal benefit sectors are similar in terms of asset size: both are small. However, they differ in almost all other respects. The human service sector, which constitutes the largest number of organizations in our study, appears to be in relatively poor financial condition, with the smallest profit margin, and the most reliance on debt.
Organizations in the public and societal benefit sector, on the other hand, appear to be in much better financial condition. They have the third highest surplus margin and are the third least reliant on debt. Although the average size of federal awards in this sector is (with the exception of the education sector), the highest, it ranked second only to the other NPO sector in the proportion of its organizations falling into the high-risk category. Not surprisingly, public and societal benefit organizations reported the fewest unqualified audit opinions on financial statements and the most material weakness in internal controls and noncompliance items.
Although human services (with the exception of the arts sector) received on average the sma llest federal awards, they ranked third in the high-risk category. In spite of this, however, their audits resulted in the fewest reportable conditions and (again, after the arts sector), their A-133 audits were more likely to result in unqualified opinions.
Health care organizations appear from this study to be in poor financial condition as well.
Although this sector had, on average, the third most assets, only human service organizations reported a lower surplus margin. In addition, they rank third highest in their reliance on debt. In addition, audits of health care organizations resulted in the most reportable conditions and going concern issues.
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The Big-5 accounting firms do not dominate this market. Instead, we found that numerous specialist and small audit firms conduct most of these audits. Their clients are more likely to be smaller and less likely to be classified as low risk. Not surprising given the risks inherent in accepting high-risk clients, these firms issued the majority of the qualified audit opinions. The dominant force in this market was small audit firms that conducted less than three single audits of nonprofit organizations during the period. These non-specialist firms accounted for half of the audit reports.
Since little research has been conducted in the nonprofit area, many avenues for further research are available. Different cognizant agencies may require additional or more complex reporting requirements. Thus, an analysis of the type and source of federal awards might shed further light on the different audit outcomes. A majority of the accounting firms conducting these complex audits complete, on average, fewer than two per year. An analysis of the quality of these audits would be useful. Since each organization can choose which auditor will perform its A-133 audit, an exploration of why an organization chooses a particular audit firm could be an important extension of this study. Public or societal benefit agencies and educational institutions were generally more likely to receive adverse audit findings, while the arts institutions were relatively less likely. Again, further research is needed to ascertain why the recipients of federal financial assistance in these sectors appear to have more internal control and other audit problems. Another interesting extension would be an analysis of the differences in attributes (if any) between nonprofits required to undergo A-133 audits and those who are not so required, both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. Finally, additional research could explore whether, after controlling for other factors, certain types of audit firms are more likely to issue adverse A-133 audit findings. observations. The difference in the number of matches may be due to errors in the EIN field distributed in the 1999 Core File.
7 NCCS' "cleaning" includes checking (and correcting) mathematical errors and contacting organizations with obvious outliers (such as a report of zero assets by a university).
(Interview with NCCS staff, January 8, 2002). 8 The full list of the 2001 Accounting Today top 100 firms was found on the Electronic
Accountant web site at http://electronicaccountant.com/html/t100y2k/tocp3.htm.
9 Governmental auditors performed only 15 audits (0.12% of total). These audits represent 15 auditees and 7 auditors. 10 The terminology used by auditors is somewhat confusing. An unqualified opinion is the best and it is sometimes referred to as a "clean" opinion. A qualified opinion indicates some reservations on the part of the auditor but not enough for an adverse opinion, that is, an opinion that the financial statements are not fairly stated or do not conform to GAAP. A disclaimer means that the auditor did not express an opinion at all.
